Safety Sells

Safety, as it pertains to management of risk, plays a very important role in the progress of aviation business. Taking a proactive role with risk, by mitigating or eliminating exposure, has a significant effect on limiting loss of life and property, in addition to having a positive effect on a company’s bottom line. There is no debating the benefits of safety programs in aviation.

However, safety must be accompanied by assurance. Using safety as a guise to promote a product or procedure ultimately fails. In scientific disciplines such as aeronautics, we attempt to seek absolute truth, but ultimately this truth is dependent on assurances through statistics and mathematics. The loving family traveling on vacation is assured the wings will stay attached to the airplane on which they travel, because thousands of airplanes, just like it, remain intact on a daily basis. Therefore, safety is also a quantitative assessment of results. One better have a way to back up their policy or procedure, or they’re missing a key footing under the façade.

To give perspective to this, the following illustrates the complexities of safety:

After the crash and subsequent investigation of TWA Flight 800, the NTSB made several recommendations regarding fuel tank flammability, fuel tank ignition sources, tank design and certification standards, and the maintenance of aging aircraft. The FAA adopted many recommendations with regards to ignition prevention, but never explicitly mandated nitrogen-inerting systems as recommended by the NTSB. Instead they took a balanced approach based on safety performance vs. cost, not the implementation of a particular ignition mitigation method.

Why didn’t the FAA fully adopt the NTSB’s recommendations?

Ultimately they wanted results, though tempered by cost-tradeoff. Someone has to pay for those nitrogen-inerting systems, and in aviation it’s usually the passenger. Aviation has thousands of regulations that make flying safer, but at what cost? At the end of the day, if flying is too expensive, the public will find another form of transport…all of which are far more dangerous than flying.

This example exclaims that one ought not invoke the sacred cow “Safety” for the sake of image, but do so with empirical fortitude derived from or guided by experience and experiment. One needs measured results…results of significance…assurance. Likewise, the US Forest Service’s emphasis on SMS is an indication of their commitment to improving safety. But they understand SMS is not simply focused on eliminating risk entirely, it’s an attempt to achieve balance.

Another example is aircraft performance. In the P2 we trade climb performance to enhance engine reliability with higher airspeeds for engine (PRT) cooling. To the laymen, an aircraft that climbs better during a takeoff may appear safer than one that does not. Unfortunately, the correlation of such things as takeoff safety to only aircraft climb performance is too simplistic. From Safety 101, one knows safety is tied to risk exposure. During a takeoff there are several variables that effect risk. How the aircraft performs during the climb is just one. What is more important, perception or reality?

Most takeoff performance of Part 25 certified aircraft is based on failure of a power plant during the takeoff, and if the takeoff is continued, the climb. Pilots live within the limitations of the aircraft, and may operate the aircraft in a way that maximizes takeoff performance in the event of engine failure. This is the way they know how to minimize their risk exposure, and maximize safety.

An engineer would probably say the best way to maximize takeoff safety is not to have the engine failure in the first place. Of course no one can guarantee with 100% certainty every takeoff will be without such failure, but operators sure can manage and maintain the aircraft in a manner that makes an engine failure less probable. With regards to turbine engine aircraft, one way is with reduced power takeoffs.

Reduced power takeoffs are somewhat a misnomer to pilots of turbine equipment, because they’re taught from day one that air in the tanks and runway behind them does no good. Using this convention one assumes, on the surface, that reduced power takeoffs reduce safety rather than increase it. Some professional pilots still believe that reduced power takeoffs are only designed to save the company money in fuel and engine life. A handful of pilots even harness their inner anti-authority, and fail to submit to even a small power reduction when allowed. The fact is the main benefit of reduced power takeoffs is reliability, even though money savings is tied to this.

Given the opportunity to reduce power during takeoff, pilots can appreciably minimize the chances of an engine failure for all takeoffs. The benefits are exponential, generally occurring in the first 40°C of turbine temperature reduction. Even a small reduction in power can have a significant outcome on dependability and longevity, which returns safety and cost benefits to the operator and customer. Additionally, there’s no real disadvantage to a reduced power takeoff, because given necessity (actual engine failure, windshear, etc.) the power is available for use.

In concert with reduced power takeoffs are takeoff credits. To maximize power reductions, and therefore engine reliability, it’s important pilots take advantage of any performance credits when available. This includes wind, pressure, and with air tankers, jettison.

An aspect of performance we at Minden Air embrace is the ability to take credit for jettisoning the retardant load. We believe this credit enhances safety in a measurable way.

Much like the controversy surrounding reduced power takeoffs, on the surface, jettison credit appears to increase risk exposure rather than decrease it because the aircraft will undoubtedly be heavier during the takeoff. However, failure to take credit for jettison may turn a reduced power takeoff into a full power takeoff, and increase exposure to engine failure in order to meet irrelevant performance requirements.

Remember, the safest takeoff is the one without the engine failure.

A great example of the safety benefits in jettison credit is at Klamath Falls, OR (KLMT). KLMT has a very long runway, but has rising terrain in all quadrants, much like the majority of air tanker bases. When using standard runway analysis (which respects the directives set forth in FAR Part 121 and 135) there is a significant performance decrement due to mandates to clear all obstacles by 35’ vertically or 300’ horizontally (200’ within the airport boundary). The aircraft is significantly restricted by the terrain and doesn’t take advantage of the long runway. In the BAe146, it’s a decrement of approximately 6000#, or 650 gallons of retardant. Obviously this mandate makes sense, but only within the context of a 121 or 135 operation, where jettisoning payload (passengers) is frowned on. And once again the climb requirements are predicated on the loss of an engine, an unlikely event in turbine equipment. It does not make sense when you have the ability to jettison while operating VMC over uncongested areas.

If one unpacks the performance in KLMT in the BAe146, and turns the 6000# difference into a reduced power takeoff, they’ll find that the required N1 power setting much less. This equates to a meaningful decrease in TGT, and corresponding increase in engine reliability.

Look at this another way…if crews are downloading 650 gallons for every flight, for no appreciable gain, they’re productivity decreases. For every 5 flights of a 3000-gallon tanker, downloading 650 gallons would require a 6th flight to obtain a near equivalent amount of retardant. That 6^th flight costs additional money, and more importantly adds additional risk.

Performing reduced power takeoffs and lending credit to jettison are just a couple examples how safety doesn’t float on the surface. When dealing with safety one must go beyond skin deep. What appears safe on the exterior could be just that, superficial. Knowing this we can meaningfully affect the long-term probability of incidents and accidents by developing root level solutions. Otherwise, we’re only being safe for the sake of appearance, and though appearances may sell, one may not have repeat customers, or repeat takeoffs.